December 17, 2004
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
The Great Powers of Europe, Redefined
By TIMOTHY GARTON ASH
Oxford, England
LAST week I stood among flag-waving demonstrators in Independence
Square in Kiev and heard the leader of Ukraine's "orange revolution," Viktor
Yushchenko, triumphantly declare that Ukraine was a European country. Not Western,
not merely democratic, and obviously not American - European.
Yesterday in Brussels, the leaders of the 25 member states of the
European Union agreed to open negotiations with Turkey next year to
join the union. Mr. Yushchenko, meanwhile, who will probably be elected
president on Dec. 26, is also expected to seek a promise of eventual
membership in the European Union for Ukraine soon after his
inauguration.
These two large, poor states on the edge of Europe will pose a huge
challenge to the adaptive capacity and internal coherence of the
political, economic and security community that is the European Union.
But their desire to become part of the union is a tribute to the
magnetic power of a body that American policymakers have dangerously
underrated in the last four years.
There are signs that in his second term, President Bush is preparing to
take the European Union more seriously as a union - not just a
collection of diverse states from which Washington can pick and choose
its allies. This is a welcome development, since only by working
together can the United States and the European Union hope to surmount
the challenges that face these twin heirs to the Enlightenment in
today's dangerous world.
The most immediate challenge, of course, is terrorism. And one could
make a strong case that the European Union's agreement to open
membership negotiations with Turkey will be a bigger contribution to
winning the war on terrorism than the American-led occupation of Iraq.
Iraq is now a bloody playground for existing groups of Islamist
terrorists - and probably a breeding ground for new ones. The European
Union's offer to Turkey, by contrast, sends a clear signal that Europe
is not an exclusive "Christian club," that the West is engaged in no
crusade, and that a largely Islamic society can be reconciled not only
with a secular state but also with the rules and customs of modern
liberal democracy.
It is also significant that the European Union's offer has been made to
a Turkish government headed by a devout Muslim, Prime Minister Recip
Tayyip Erdogan, who was jailed just five years ago for publicly
reciting a poem containing the lines, "The mosques are our barracks,
the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful are
our warriors." Mr. Erdogan is now doing everything in his power to meet
what Turks call "European standards."
Why is it that Americans do not understand the power of the European
Union? Is it because they are simply not well informed by reports from
Brussels and other European capitals? Or is it because, as citizens of
the world's last truly sovereign nation-state, Americans - and
especially American conservatives - find it difficult to acknowledge
the contribution of a transnational organization based on supranational
law? It's as if they can conceive of power only in the old-fashioned
terms of a classical nation-state.
Robert Kagan describes the difference between America and Europe as the
difference between power and weakness - American power, that is, and
European weakness. This description is sustainable only if power is
measured in terms of military strength. In the way that some American
conservatives talk about the European Union, I hear an echo of Stalin's
famous question about the Vatican's power: how many divisions does the
pope have? But the pope defeated Stalin in the end. This attitude
overlooks the dimensions of European power that are not to be found on
the battlefield.
In economic power, the European Union is the equal of the United
States: the combined gross domestic product of the union's 25 member
states is some $11 trillion at current exchange rates, about the same
as the G.D.P. of the United States. American business has long
recognized the importance of the European market, and it is also
beginning to understand the influence of its regulators. Three years
ago the union blocked the merger of two American companies, General
Electric and Honeywell - after American regulators had already approved
the deal.
The European Union is also strong in a less tangible kind of power -
what is known as "soft power." The European way of life, its culture
and societies, are enormously appealing to many of its neighbors.
Meanwhile, the policies of the Bush administration have prompted a wave
of hostility toward America around the world, while its security
measures have made it more difficult for foreigners to study or work in
the United States. So Europe may currently have a comparative advantage
in the exercise of soft power, if only temporarily.
Yet the most distinctive feature of European power is a fourth
dimension - one that the United States wholly lacks. It is the power of
induction. Put very simply: the European Union is getting bigger, and
the United States is not. Haiti cannot hope to follow Hawaii into the
American union, and even an American territory like Puerto Rico faces
resistance in becoming the 51st state. But Ukraine can hope to follow
Poland into the European Union.
AS we have seen across central and eastern Europe, and now in the
Balkans and in Turkey, countries that wish to join the European Union
are prepared to make profound changes to their economic, social, legal
and political systems in order to qualify. Indeed, in the run-up to
accession, the union has intervened extensively in the affairs of
candidate states, but it has done so with the consent of their
democratically elected governments. This is regime change,
European-style.
The history of the European Union can be told as a story of the
expansion of freedom: from the original six postwar democracies in
western Europe; to 12 member states, including three former
dictatorships in southern Europe; to 25, including many of the former
Communist states of central and eastern Europe; and now on to the
Balkans, Turkey and, one day, Ukraine.
It can't go on forever, obviously. If Europe is everywhere, it will be
nowhere. So the European Union must decide what to offer neighbors that
cannot be members. But for now, the European power of induction is
working its magic on the streets of Kiev and Istanbul.
"The wisest use of American strength is to advance freedom," President
Bush has said. Yet by overlooking the true dimensions of European
power, America is failing to recognize the potential of what could be
its greatest ally in the most hopeful project of our time: the
advancement of liberty around the world.
Timothy Garton Ash, a fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford, and the
Hoover Institution at Stanford, is the author, most recently, of "Free
World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West."
Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company